Introduction
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine published a report [1] that suggested between 44 000 and 98 000 people die each year because of preventable medical error. Even the more conservative estimate suggests that medical error causes more death annually than motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS. The present report resulted in unprecedented focus of attention on the issue of error in medicine. However, there is little evidence of widely available improvements in patient safety. According to leading patient safety researcher Leape [2] , of the primary barriers to progress 'the first such challenge is (the) complexity' of medical practice.
Limitations of traditional approaches
Conventional approaches to medical error are poorly suited to address this complexity. Within the culture of medicine, the traditional approach to error involves assigning blame to a single individual. This attitude towards error is exemplified by the litigious climate and medical malpractice claims in the United States. However, the framework of individual accountability is poorly suited to address the problem of medical error, as it fails to address the complexity of the system within which medical error occurs. Rarely, medical error is only the result of the actions of a single person -the importance of systemic causes of medical error has been raised by several leading error researchers [3] . In addition, and in keeping with contemporary human error research [4] , we propose that approaches seeking to eradicate error fail to recognize that error recovery is integral to any cognitive work. The critical role of error recovery mechanisms in the maintenance of system safety is neglected by approaches that focus exclusively on completed errors. Furthermore, the retrospective analysis of completed error is vulnerable to bias, as actions that have led to error tend to be viewed as incorrect even though they may have been the best alternative with the information available at the point of decision.
New perspectives on error
In recognition of the limitations of traditional approaches to error management, contemporary research on human error in intensive care and other safety-critical environments has shifted focus from trying to identify the erroneous action of the individual to characterizing the larger context in which the cognitive work of this individual takes place. In addition, the critical role of error recovery has emerged as a research focus.
Distributed cognition
Faulty action is a product of flawed thinking. However, thought processes underlying critical care decision making do not exist in the mind of a single individual. Rather, they are spread or distributed across the minds of many types of clinician, and across artifacts (physical objects such as notes and computer equipment). The framework of distributed cognition, pioneered by cognitive scientist Hutchins [5] , shifts the focus of cognitive science from the study of individuals in controlled settings to the study of groups of individuals in their real-world context. This framework provides a set of methods to characterize the distribution of mental workload across human agents and technology, and its application to the critical care context has been advocated by a number of authors including Hazlehurst et al. [6] , Xiao et al. [7 ] and Patel et al. [8] . The strength of the distributed cognition framework is its extension of traditional cognitive analysis to include human interaction technologies (external representations) such as physical media that support collaborative work in complex contexts and tasks. Xiao et al. [7 ] direct their investigations toward this aspect of distributed cognition, characterizing the ways in which external representations support clinical care in practice. A number of other empirical studies employing this framework in the context of critical care have emerged in recent years.
Distributed cognition and vulnerability to error
While research on distributed cognition tends to focus on the advantages conferred by the distribution of cognitive tasks, the methods and theoretical framework have also been employed in the study of error. A series of cognitive ethnographic studies were conducted in parallel in three critical care environments at Columbia University Medical Center: the ICU [9] and the medical [10] and psychiatric emergency departments (PEDs) [11] . The primary objective was to characterize the cognitive system underlying decision making, and consequently error, in critical care medicine. Ethnographic and interview data were analyzed to characterize the distribution of cognitive work and information flow in each context, revealing latent systemic flaws that are vulnerable to error. This characterization was enriched by cognitive analysis of recorded verbal protocols, including collaborative decision making during rounds. The analysis of these data required the development of novel methodologies, and resulted in the characterization of the cognitive mechanisms underlying error in each domain. Malhotra et al. [9] present a methodology for the modeling of workflow within the complex cognitive systems that underlie critical care work. This methodology involves the detailed characterization of individual workflows, with the identification of events of critical clinical importance. A collective workflow is then reconstructed from events of critical importance that are temporally or spatially correlated, and performed collaboratively. The methodology is implemented in order to construct a detailed workflow model of an intensive care unit. Cohen et al. [11, 12 ] interpret psychiatric emergency data using the distributed cognition framework. While the distribution of cognitive processes across groups and individuals generally enhances the capacity of a cognitive system, it may introduce additional vulnerabilities to error. This analysis focuses on the identification of the vulnerabilities conferred by the distribution of cognitive work in the emergency department (ED), revealing several latent flaws in the system related to the underlying distribution of cognition across teams, time, space and artifacts. Laxmisan et al. [10] focus their analysis of data from the medical emergency room on the cognitive demands imposed by multitasking, interruptions and handovers during shift change. Within the captured data, on average, interruptions occur every 9 min for attending clinicians, and every 14 min for residents. In addition, gaps in information flow are found to occur during handoffs at shift change. The studies described above illustrate methods for the characterization and modeling of the distributed cognitive systems that underlie critical care work, enabling the prediction of their vulnerability to error. A recent paper [13 ] reviews the cognitive dimensions of complex critical care environments.
It is well known that errors increase as a function of complexity. The phrase 'error in evolution' denotes the progression of a series of small mistakes towards a cumulative adverse event; erroneous decisions undergo a selection process based on their anticipated consequences. Figure 1 illustrates progression of error in critical care, where clinicians conducting routine work hit a boundary and where they come close to making an error. At this stage, the error can still be detected and corrected before
Figure 1 The evolution of medical error
Breaching the first boundary can be considered as a violation of the consensual bounds of safe practice. At this stage (the near miss) the opportunity exists to correct and detect this error, before the second boundary is reached. The exclusive analysis of adverse event reports fails to attend to the incidents of near miss and recovery that are an integral part of cognitive work in critical care.
the second boundary is crossed, resulting in an adverse event. Clinicians make decisions in a highly complex environment by negotiations and compromises as they trade off between competing goals. In order to characterize the systemic causes of error in such environments, we need to identify the pressures (e.g. fatigue, workload, policy, and lack of resources) that push people towards these boundaries, and then make efforts to counteract pressures.
Focus on error recovery
Recent European literature on human error has drawn attention to the critical role played by error recovery in securing system safety in the aviation and transport industries.
Error recovery in aviation
The critical role of error recovery in aviation safety was shown by Amalberti and Wioland [14] in a study of error commission and recovery by crews during 44 h flight. Error production and error detection rate are studied as a function of task demand. Three levels of demand are considered; very demanding (first reaction to failures, flight incidents, take-offs, final approach and landing), busy (middle term reaction to failures, planning and replanning), low workload (the rest of the flight, inclusive cruise). While it might seem intuitive that more errors would occur at high workload, the results of this study showed the greatest number of errors at low workload, with the least errors at high workload. However, at high workload, error detection was reduced, leading to a much higher rate of actual incidents (or completed errors). Further evidence for the role of error recovery was provided by studying the performance of trainees using simulations of air traffic control. With training, raw error rate eventually stabilized at around 12 errors per hour. However, the rate of error detection continued to improve with practice.
Technology failures are fixed by correcting technology, and thus the perception exists that human failures should be addressed by correcting faulty human behaviors. This perspective led safety and design engineers to conclude that in systems design, human errors must be suppressed or at least considerably reduced in the same way that system failures must be reduced. A more modern thought is that human error cannot be eradicated, but negative consequences can be controlled [15] . Thus, a better safety goal should not target the reduction of human error production but rather should control the propagation of human error towards accident occurrence.
Error recovery in the ICU
Kubose et al. [16] conducted a study of error detection and recovery in the ICU, using methods of observation, shadowing of ICU team members, audio recording, and analysis of infusion pump keystroke logs. Four handovers (in which information is exchanged between clinicians at shift change) and rounds (in which the team gathers and reassess the management plan for a particular patient) for six patients were captured. Recorded protocols were analyzed and coded for error detection and recovery. Both handovers and rounds exhibited error detection, with a mean of 10.5 errors per handover and 5.6 per round. Most errors detected were recovered (mean of 5.25 per round and 7.25 per handover, respectively). Further studies were conducted to determine the relationship between expertise and error correction, by selectively shadowing clinicians of different levels of experience. The results suggest that clinicians of all levels of expertise make mistakes; however, experts are better able to detect and recover from error. While these findings challenge the common perception that experts are somehow infallible, they are consistent with error research in other domains, which shows a constant rate of error regardless of expertise (with the exception of absolute beginners), but that experts tend to make types of errors that are more readily recovered [4] . Similarly, Nyssen and Blavier [17] investigate the role of error detection in anesthesiology using retrospective analysis data obtained from an accident reporting system employed in two university hospitals in Belgium. Their results emphasize the importance of standard checks in error detection, and show significant relationships between type of error and error detection mode, as well as type of error and the level of expertise of the anesthetist concerned.
Error recovery in the emergency department
Cohen et al. [12 ] studied evidence of the evolution of error in audio-recorded data capturing discussions between colleagues on clinical rounds in a PED. Excerpts from recordings suggesting perceived violations of the accepted bounds of safe practice or incidents of miscommunication were extracted and analyzed using qualitative coding methods. This analysis reveals a variety of perceived violations, many of which have potentially serious consequences for patient safety. Of these incidents, only one had been formally reported. However, 10 incidents were considered by physicians with domain experience to have potentially dangerous consequences. Frequently, perceived violations were followed by corrective actions, such as the prescription of a previously neglected medication, revealing both the apparent boundaries of acceptable practice and the mechanisms in place to correct a violation of these boundaries. Such analysis of the detection and prevention of potential error during patient rounds expands the data available for error analysis beyond the occasional reported adverse event. These findings are consistent with contemporary error research, which suggests that the detection and correction of potential error are an integral part of cognitive work in the complex, modern-day workplace.
Resilience
Another related concept that has emerged in contemporary studies of human error is that of resilience. Hollnagel [18] draws the analogy between the ability of materials to accommodate stress and the ability of a system to maintain performance under high production pressure. This approach represents a promising line of inquiry into the both the qualities of a system that confer resilience, and the nature of the production pressures that push a system to its limits.
It is our view that error cannot be eradicated; error and error recovery form an integral part of the cognitive system underlying critical care (and other complex tasks). Preliminary research in the ICU suggests that both expert and novice clinicians make mistakes (Table 1) . However, experts are better able to detect and recover from their mistakes, a finding consistent with research in other contexts. The mechanisms of error detection and correction in the ICU are poorly understood. An error occurs when the bounds of acceptable practice are violated. Failure to detect this error represents the crossing of another boundary, and may result in an adverse event. The study of the process of error detection and correction will reveal these boundaries, making the constraints of acceptable practice visible. In addition, research in other domains suggests that in conditions of maximal productivity, the balance between error commission and error correction shifts. These situations challenge the cognitive capacity of the system, pushing it towards the limits of safe practice. The study of error emergence, detection and recovery in context will reveal these error-prone states, and the factors that drive the system towards them.
Conclusion
The review highlights the need for approaches to error that address the complex nature of critical care work. The framework of individual accountability is poorly suited to the problem, as it isolates erroneous action from its larger context. In keeping with contemporary human error research, we propose that approaches seeking to eradicate error fail to recognize that error detection and recovery are integral to any cognitive work. Future research should focus on developing new approaches to medical error that focus on the emergence, detection and management of error within a complex cognitive system. Note that in this study, experts made more errors than their less experienced colleagues, but recovered from these faster and more frequently.
